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Time Variation in Information Production: Evidence from Mutual Funds
We investigate the time variation in information production in the context of U.S. actively
managed mutual funds. We show that investment strategies of funds are more dispersed
when market returns are low. Further, investors respond di®erently to fund performance
depending on market conditions. Fund °ows are less sensitive to past performance in down
markets than in up markets. At the same time, in down markets investors learn about funds
from other sources, in that fund °ows are more responsive to information contained in other
sources, such as funds' investment strategies. We argue that the di®erences in °ow sensitivity
can be driven by time variation in information production.
JEL classi¯cation: G23, G11, G14.
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Is the production of information time varying? Previous studies argue that the quality of
information may change with market conditions. Dyck and Zingales (2003) claim that less
unique private information is generated in up markets since \incentives to uncover informa-
tion by speculators are much smaller during stock market booms". Also, Welch (2000) ¯nds
that analysts produce less unique information when market conditions are favorable. And
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document that stock market volatility tends to
increase after a drop in market prices.
We investigate the time variation in information production in the mutual fund industry.
Actively managed mutual funds are a natural market to study the use of information since
their very existence depends on the production and use of ¯nancial information. Empirically,
we document that fund managers' strategies change with market conditions. Mutual fund
°ows react to information, such as the mutual funds' abnormal performance. We document
how investors react to information in di®erent market conditions by showing how the °ow
of funds di®er across market conditions.
We use quarterly data on more than 3,000 unique U.S. diversi¯ed equity funds over the
period 1980-2005. Funds' investment strategies are more dispersed when market returns are
low than when market returns are high; the cross-sectional deviations in terms of systematic
risk, unsystematic risk, and industry concentration are larger when market returns are low.
We also look at the relationship between fund °ows and past fund performance. The
question is motivated by empirical evidence in a number of studies that document that
funds with good abnormal performance tend to receive higher °ows than funds with poor
abnormal performance.1 Empirically, little is known about how fund-speci¯c °ows react
to information contained in fund performance in di®erent market conditions. We ¯nd that
1See, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Del Guercio and Tkac
(2002).
1investors respond di®erently to fund performance in di®erent market conditions. Although
we observe a positive relation between °ows and performance in all market conditions, fund
°ows are less sensitive to past performance in down markets than in up markets.
But are investors' reactions to information justi¯ed by the information content of fund
abnormal performance? In order to determine whether the reactions are justi¯ed by the
information content of performance we use the arguments in Berk and Green (2004) as our
rational benchmark for how investors °ows should react to new information. In the Berk and
Green (2004) model, investors rationally funnel °ows based on their estimate of managerial
ability. Managerial ability is assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale. In equilibrium,
money °ows until the expected abnormal performance of each fund is zero. As a consequence,
the model predicts that the °ows should be such that there is no performance persistence.
Empirically, we compare performance persistence in down and up markets. We ¯nd little
evidence of performance persistence when market returns are low, but some persistence
when returns are high. These patterns suggest that di®erences in °ows, when conditioning
on market returns, are driven by time variation in the information available to mutual fund
investors.
Are investors able to learn about managerial ability in down markets through other
signals besides performance? Moreover, since we do ¯nd some persistence in performance
in up markets, can we observe that investors use information more e±ciently when market
returns are low relative to when market returns are high? We choose managerial investing
strategies as signals of managerial ability that investors could learn from. We conjecture
that investors might learn more e±ciently in down markets by putting more weight on these
signals relative to the weight they put in up markets. Consistent with our conjecture we
¯nd that investors are more responsive to information about investment strategies in down
markets than they are in up markets.
An extensive empirical literature examines the performance of mutual funds based on
2either factor models or fund holdings. Studies based on factor-based measures include
Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Ferson and Schadt (1996), and Carhart (1997).
Holding-based measures are considered by Grinblatt and Titman (1993), Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1995), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Chen, Jegadeesh, and
Wermers (2000), and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005a). More recent studies, including
P· astor and Stambaugh (2002), Cohen, Coval, and P· astor (2005), Cremers and Petajisto
(2007), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2007) consider
measures that factor in beliefs and di®erent ways of measuring information content.
Empirical evidence on the persistence of mutual fund performance is mixed. Brown
and Goetzmann (1995) and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996), among others, ¯nd statistical
evidence of performance persistence for U.S. mutual funds. Carhart (1997) ¯nds that the
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor can explain in large part the year-to-year
persistence observed when using performance measures not accounting for momentum. More
recently, Kosowski, Timmermann, White, and Wermers (2006) use recursive portfolios sorted
annually on past four-factor alphas (including a momentum factor) to study performance
persistence. They ¯nd that an equal-weighted recursive portfolio of funds that were in the
top decile in terms of alphas in the previous year generate a future alpha close to 1% in the
next year. They also ¯nd that deciles 6 to 10 generate signi¯cantly negative alphas in the
future.
Remolona, Kleiman, and Gruenstein (1997) study how market returns in°uence aggregate
mutual fund °ows. They ¯nd that the positive e®ect of market-wide returns on aggregate
fund °ows is weak, at best. But interestingly, they ¯nd that the relationship becomes stronger
during certain episodes of major market declines, i.e. fund °ows decrease during major mar-
ket declines. Also see Warther (1995), Edelen and Warner (2001), and Karceski (2002) who
study the inverse relationship: the e®ect of aggregate fund °ows on market-wide returns.
Further, Moskowitz (2000) ¯nds that, although average mutual fund returns are uncondi-
3tionally lower than market-wide returns, mutual fund returns are greater than market-wide
returns during recessions. Kosowski (2006) uses risk-adjusted performance measure and ¯nds
signi¯cant over-performance during recessions, but not during the remainder of the business
cycle.
II. Model
Suppose a one-period economy where the state s 2 S is known. A representative investor has
marginal utility ms in state s. The current framework does not require a parameterization
of the pricing kernel ms. The only assumption made on ms is that it is higher in bad states
than in good states, similar to what a consumption-based model parameterization would
predict.
The investor can exert e®ort eI
s 2 <+ in state s to learn more about di®erent fund
managers (skills, strategies, etc.). The more he learns about the fund managers, the better
the investor can pick those who will outperform. For simplicity, I assume that the abnormal
performance allowed by e®ort eI
s is simply eI
s. This abnormal performance is collected at the
end of the period.
Learning about fund managers and generating an abnormal performance of eI
s costs C(eI
s)
at the beginning of the period. The cost function C : <+ ! <+ is increasing and strictly
convex in e®ort. The costs may be seen as research expenses or as opportunity costs for the
investor's time. The cost function is assumed to be independent of the state of the economy.









4In each state, the optimal e®ort eI¤
s satis¯es ms = C0(eI¤
s ). The strict convexity of C(¢)
implies that the optimal e®ort level eI¤
s increases with the pricing kernel ms. Hence in bad
economic states, when ms is higher, investors will spend more e®ort to research mutual funds.
Therefore Berk and Green's (2004) prediction is more likely to hold during bad times, as is
the case in our sample.
Now suppose that the compensation (fee, °ows, career, etc.) that a fund manager receives
for his own e®ort eM
s increases with the investor's knowledge of the industry, as represented
by the investor's e®ort eI
s. When the investor is well informed, managerial e®ort should
be compensated more than when the investor is uninformed. Let V (eI
s)eM
s be the reward
collected by a fund manager who exerts e®ort eM
s when the representative investor exerts
e®ort eI
s. The function V (¢) is assumed to be positive and strictly increasing. Similar to the
investor, the fund manager faces a cost function K(eM
s ) when he exerts e®ort eM
s . In our
model, the cost function K(¢) carries all the information useful to identify the skill level of a
fund manager. If one manager faces larger costs than another in order to produce eM
s , he is
therefore less skilled than the other. We assume that this cost function takes the quadratic
form K(x) = µ
2x2, for x ¸ 0, where µ > 0. Therefore K0(x) = µx and µ is the slope of the
marginal cost function. As µ increases, the cost of producing active returns increases as well.
The skill level of the fund manager is symbolized by µ¡1.















for a given level of e®ort eI
s by the investor.
The FOC's in each state leads to V (eI
s) = µeM¤
s , i.e. the marginal cost of e®ort equals
the marginal reward collected because of this e®ort. Thus, as the investor exerts more e®ort
to pick the best fund managers, the e®ort exerted by the fund manager increases as well.
5Therefore, in equilibrium, we should observe higher e®ort from the investor in bad states
and this should also lead to higher e®ort from the fund manager. Both of these predictions
can be linked to our empirical ¯ndings.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
For our empirical analysis, we merge the CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database
with the Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum holdings database and the CRSP stock price
data following the methodology of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2007). Our sample covers
the time period between 1980 and 2005. The CRSP mutual fund database includes infor-
mation on fund returns, total net assets, di®erent types of fees, investment objectives, and
other fund characteristics. The CDA/Spectrum database provides stock{holdings of mutual
funds. These data are collected both from reports ¯led by mutual funds with the SEC and
from voluntary reports generated by the funds. We also link reported stock{holdings to the
CRSP stock database.
We focus our analysis on open-end domestic diversi¯ed equity mutual funds, for which
the holdings data are most complete and reliable. We therefore eliminate balanced, bond,
money market, international, sector, and index funds, as well as funds not invested primarily
in equity securities from our sample. We also exclude funds which hold less than 10 stocks,
those which invest less than 80% of their assets in equity, those which in the previous month
manage less than 5 million and those which have an annual expense ratio above 4%. For
funds with multiple share classes, we eliminate the duplicate funds and compute the fund-
level variables by aggregating across the di®erent share classes. Appendix A provides further
details on the sample selection.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main fund attributes. Our sample includes
3,261 distinct funds and 81,971 fund-quarter observations. The number of funds in each
6quarter ranges from 158 (1980, Q2) to 1,636 (2001, Q4). We report summary statistics on
fund total net assets (TNA), age, expenses, monthly returns, monthly performance, based
on a four-factor model, and new money growth. We de¯ne new money growth (NMG) as
the growth rate of the assets under management (TNA) after adjusting for the appreciation
of the mutual fund's assets (Ri












As Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) report, the CRSP mutual fund databse contains
errors associated with mutual fund mergers and splits. These errors result in extreme values
of NMGi
t. To reduce the impact of such outliers, we replace extreme values (i.e. top and
bottom 0:5%) by the 99:5 and 0:5 percentile values respectively.
We use a three-quarter moving-average of market returns to proxy for market conditions.





3 , where Rmkt
¿ denotes the S&P500 return
during quarter ¿. We capture the level of the conditioning variable in each quarter by
assigning it into one of three categories: High, Low, and Mid such that 20% of the quarters
with the highest levels of the conditioning variable are assigned into the ¯rst category, 20%
of the quarters with the lowest levels of the conditioning variable are assigned into the second
category, and the remaining quarters are assigned into the third category. Accordingly, we
de¯ne two indicator variables I(¼t = Up) and I(¼t = Down) to capture the state of the
market. I(¼t = Up) equals to one if the conditioning variable is in the top 20%, and zero
otherwise; I(¼t = Down) equals to one if the conditioning variable is in the bottom 20%, and
zero otherwise.
7IV. Mutual Fund Investment Strategies
We argue that the amount of information produced by mutual funds may vary with mar-
ket conditions. Thus, one would expect that in times with more unique information being
produced, funds may want to pursue more distinct investment strategies. We explore such
a possibility by analyzing how dispersion in investment strategies across funds changes with
market conditions. To capture the degree of dispersion in fund managers' investment deci-
sions, we use three measures of dispersion in portfolios held by managers, similar to Chevalier
and Ellison (1999). These measures capture dispersion in managers' portfolios with respect
to a typical portfolio at a given time t. We now discuss these measures.
IV.A. Dispersion Measures
We consider three dispersion measures. The ¯rst dispersion measure is SectorDeviationit,
which measures boldness in the style of the manager. It captures how much a manager
concentrates his portfolio in sectors that di®er from those that are most popular at the time.
Speci¯cally, SectorDeviationit is de¯ned as the mean square root of the sum of squared
di®erences between the share of fund i's assets in each of 10 industry sectors of Fama and
French (1997) and the mean share in each sector in quarter t among all funds in fund i's









(wkj ¡ wg;v)2); (4)
where wk is the weight of stock k in industry j, and wg;v is the weight of a fund objective
(growth, value) in the same industry j; J is the number of distinct industries.
2To identify investment objectives we use CDA style categories 2,3, and 4. Industry sectors are de¯ned
using a modi¯ed 10-industry classi¯cation of Fama and French, as in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005b).
8The second dispersion measure is UnsysDeviationit and measures fund boldness in terms
of a departure from a typical portfolio, based on the level of its unsystematic risk. Speci¯cally,
the variable is calculated as the absolute value of the di®erence between a fund's unsystematic
risk, UnsysRiskit, and the sample average of this variable over all funds in fund i's objective
class in quarter t. UnsysRiskit is the absolute value of the residual from the four-factor
model of Carhart (1997).
UnsysDeviationit =j UnsysRiskit ¡ UnsysRiskg;v j (5)
Finally, the third dispersion measure is BetaDeviationit. It measures boldness in the
sense of taking a large bet on the direction of the market. The variable is calculated as the
absolute value of the di®erence between fund i's beta in quarter t and the average beta in
that quarter of all funds in fund i's objective class. Individual fund beta is a market beta
from a four-factor model calculated using 36 months of past returns.
BetaDeviationit =j Betait ¡ Betag;v j (6)
By construction, a smaller value for each of these variables corresponds to less dispersion in
manager portfolios and thus possibly less unique information being produced.
IV.B. Empirical Results
Our tests relate the measures of dispersion of investment strategies to market conditions
using a multivariate regression framework. Speci¯cally, we estimate the regression model:
Dispersioni;t = ¯0 + ¯1I(¼t = Up) + ¯2I(¼t = Down) + ¯3Xi;t + TimeFE + ²i;t: (7)
9Here Dispersioni;t denotes the degree of similarity in investment strategy of fund i at time
t and is proxied by SectorDeviation, UnsysDeviation, and BetaDeviation. I(¼t = Up) and
I(¼t = Down) represent the state of the market and Xi;t de¯nes the set of di®erent control
variables. Our other controls include fund size, fund past °ows, and fund age. We addi-
tionally include time ¯xed e®ects in all our speci¯cations. Finally, some of the speci¯cations
include fund ¯xed-e®ects.
The coe±cients of interest are ¯1 and ¯2. We expect these coe±cients to systematically
vary if the fund strategies di®er in up and down markets. For instance, if the fund manager
strategies are similar in up markets relative to down markets, we should expect ¯1 to be
negative and/or ¯2 to be positive.
We present the results of this regression in Table 2 using the three measures of managerial
investment strategies. The ¯rst, third and ¯fth columns of the table report the results
using a random fund e®ects speci¯cation. We ¯nd that the funds exhibit more similarity in
terms of BetaDeviation (¯1 < 0) and UnsysDeviation (¯2 > 0). The results are mixed for
SectorDeviation where we ¯nd that ¯2 > 0 and ¯1 > 0 as well. The second, fourth, and
sixth columns report the results of re-estimating the regression model including fund ¯xed
e®ects. Doing so controls for any time-invariant fund characteristics. The results suggest
that ¯1 < 0 for BetaDeviation, and ¯2 > 0 for UnsysDeviation and SectorDeviation. These
results strongly support the notion that the portfolio characteristics of funds are more similar
in the up market relative to down market.
V. The Flow-Performance Relationship
Given that fund managers follow investment strategies that are time varying, it is reasonable
to expect that investors' reaction to fund performance is also time varying. We examine how
the relationship between past performance and subsequent fund °ows changes with market
10conditions. Our hypothesis suggests that °ows and their sensitivity to fund performance
should di®er with market conditions.
Since the °ow-performance relationship has been shown to be nonlinear (see Chevalier
and Ellison (1997)), we start by depicting the °ow-performance relation semi-parametrically.
Since °ows may be also a®ected by fund characteristics other than performance, we ¯rst
remove the variation in °ows that is caused by these other conditioning variables. To this
end, we estimate the pooled regression:
NMG
i










t denotes the number of years elapsed, as of time t, since fund i was ¯rst o®ered;
Ln(TNAi
t) denotes the log of total net assets, in millions of dollars, of fund i at time t;
Expi
t denotes the percentage total fees charged annually by fund i at time t, and TimeFE
captures time ¯xed-e®ects. Note that time ¯xed-e®ects account for overall °ows in and out
of the actively managed equity mutual fund industry.
We look at the °ows not explained by fund characteristics, as de¯ned by ei
t in equation
(8), which we refer to as unexplained °ows, and relate them to past fund performance. At
the end of each quarter, we group funds into 20 equal-size bins based on funds' four-factor
alphas during that quarter. We then separate the bins depending on whether they were
formed during up or down market and average the °ows within each bin. Figure 1 reports
the results.
Overall, there is a positive association between performance and subsequent °ows, both
in up and down markets and °ows seem to be less sensitive to past performance in down
markets. The pattern holds both for well and poor performing funds. Also, the shape of the
°ow-performance relationship seems somewhat di®erent in up and down markets; it appears
more convex in up markets than in down markets.
11These observations are further corroborated by a more parametric regression analysis.
To capture both market dependency and possible non-linearities in the °ow-performance
relation in the regressions, we interact dummy variables for the three levels of the market
condition with fund °ows and squared fund °ows.3
We estimate the regression:
NMG
i







t + TimeFE + ²
i
t; (9)
where ¼t is the market state variable at time t (I(¼t = Up) or I(¼t = Down)) are indicator
variables for market returns; ®i
t is fund i's four-factor alpha in quarter t, and Xi;t de¯nes the
set of control variables including fund size, expenses, and fund age. We also include time
¯xed e®ects. To facilitate interpretation of the results, we standardize all fund characteristics
by demeaning each variable by its sample standard deviation.
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The regression results reported in the third column
3 are consistent previous studies that suggest a strong and convex relation between past
fund performance and subsequent °ows. For example, a fund with an alpha of 1% should
experience a °ow of roughly 0:5% more than an identical fund with an alpha of 0%.
The conditional regressions reported in the second and fourth columns suggest a strong
dependence of °ows on market conditions. The coe±cient on ®i
t goes down by roughly 50%
in down markets, compared to up markets ( reported in the second column). The ¯nding
suggests that °ows respond less to a given level of realized alpha in down markets than in
up markets.
From the results reported in the fourth column, fund °ows seem somewhat more convex
in down markets relative to up markets, although the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant.
3We repeat the same analysis including a cubic fund performance term, which we do not report here.
The results are largely una®ected.
12Overall, we ¯nd that past performance is an important determinant of subsequent fund
°ows. Further, we show that the °ow-performance relationship strongly depends on market
conditions. When market returns are low, °ows appear to be less sensitive to past perfor-
mance.
VI. Performance Persistence
Flows react di®erently to performance depending on market conditions. The question is
whether investors' reactions to information is justi¯ed by the information content of fund
abnormal performance. We link the changes in the °ow-performance relationship to changes
in the informational environment. According to Berk and Green (2004), rational °ows would
ensure that expected alpha is zero across all funds. Fund performance therefore should have
no persistence. We use the prediction as a way of evaluating whether changes in °ow-
performance sensitivity are rational responses to changes in the informational environment.
To test performance persistence we follow Carhart (1997). We assign funds into decile
portfolios based on their past performance. The funds are then sorted based on the state of
the market in this quarter. Subsequently, we calculate the average alpha of each portfolio
over the subsequent one quarter.
Figure 2 depicts the results. We observe signi¯cantly di®erent persistence patterns de-
pending on whether portfolios were formed in up or down markets. In up markets, next
quarter alphas are monotonically related to past alphas. The di®erence in next quarter
alphas between deciles 1 and 10 is 0:89% per quarter. In contrast, in down markets subse-
quent alphas of these portfolios do not have any signi¯cant relation past performance. All
performance deciles exhibit negative alpha of ¡0:5% to ¡1:0%.
In summary, we ¯nd that the lower sensitivity of °ows to performance in bad markets
does not result in more performance persistence. Therefore, the patterns we document
13suggest that di®erences in °ows, when conditioning on market returns, are driven by the
time variation in the informational environment.
VII. The Flow-Performance Relation and Investment
Strategies
We found that fund °ows are less sensitive to performance in down markets than in up
markets. At the same time, lack of response by investors does not lead to any persistence in
fund performance in the down market. An obvious question therefore is whether investors
are able to learn about managerial ability in down markets through other signals besides
performance? Moreover, since we do ¯nd some persistence in performance in up markets, do
investors use information more e±ciently in up markets relative to low markets? Following
our results in Section IV., we choose managerial investing strategies (SectorDeviation, Un-
sysDeviation, and BetaDeviation) as signals of managerial ability that investors could learn
from. We hypothesize that investors might learn more e±ciently in down markets by putting
more weight on managerial strategies relative to the weight they put on the strategies in up
markets.
We add variables that control for changes in managerial investing strategies to the re-
gressions in (9). The results are presented in Table 4. The ¯rst three columns of the table
report the results from including each of the investment strategy variables in turn, and the
fourth column reports the results from including all the measures together. The ¯fth column
also include fund ¯xed e®ects to control for any time invariant fund speci¯c traits that might
drive investor °ows.
Our results in all the speci¯cations suggest that investors put more weight on the strate-
gies in down markets. In other words, fund °ows are more sensitive to these measures in down
14markets than in up markets. For robustness, we also examine whether investor response to
other fund speci¯c variables (like age of the fund) also varies with market conditions. We
¯nd no such evidence.
Overall, our ¯ndings suggest that investors are using information about investment strate-
gies di®erently depending market conditions. More speci¯cally, investors seem to assign more
weight to investment strategies of managers in down markets. This may explain why investors
are able to respond to fund performance in a more rational manner{in the Berk and Green
(2004) sense by competing away performance persistence{when the market conditions are
down.
VIII. Conclusion
We show that mutual fund managers as well as their investors behave di®erently depending
on market conditions. In particular, investment strategies are more dispersed when market
returns are low than when they are high. We also ¯nd that investors respond di®erently to
fund performance and fund investment strategies depending on market conditions. Using
the Berk and Green's (2004) economy as a benchmark, we argue that the di®erence in °ow
sensitivity may be driven by time variation in information production.
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17Appendix A. Sample Selection
We start with a sample of all mutual funds in the CRSP mutual fund database covering the period
between 1980 and 2005. The focus of our analysis is on domestic equity mutual funds, for which
the holdings data are the most complete and reliable. As a result, we eliminate balanced, bond,
money market, sector, and international funds, as well as funds not invested primarily in equity
securities.
We base our selection criteria on the objective codes and on the disclosed asset compositions.
First, we select funds with the following ICDI objectives: AG, GI, LG, or IN. If a fund does not have
any of the above ICDI objectives, we select funds with the following Strategic Insight objectives:
AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, or SCG. If a fund has neither the Strategic Insight nor the ICDI
objective, then we go to the Wiesenberger Fund Type Code and pick funds with the following
objectives: G, G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, MCG, and SCG. If none of these objectives
are available and the fund has the CS policy (Common Stocks are the mainly held securities by
the fund), then the fund will be included. We exclude funds that have the following Investment
Objective Codes in the Spectrum Database: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred,
and Balanced. Since the reported objectives do not always indicate whether a fund portfolio is
balanced or not, we also exclude funds that, on average, hold less than 80% in stocks and those
which have an annual expense ratio above 4%.
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2004) identify a form of survival bias in the CRSP
mutual fund database, which results from a strategy used by fund families to enhance their return
histories. Fund families might incubate several private funds and they will only make public the
track record of the surviving incubated funds, while the returns for those funds that are terminated
are not made public. To address this incubation bias, we exclude the observations where the year
for the observation is prior to the reported fund starting year and we exclude observations where
the names of the funds are missing in the CRSP database. Data may be reported prior to the
year of fund mutual fund database, which results from a strategy used by fund families to enhance
their return histories. Fund families might incubate several private funds and they will only make
18public the track record of the surviving incubated funds, while the returns for those funds that are
terminated are not made public. To address this incubation bias, we exclude the observations where
the year for the observation is prior to the reported fund starting year and we exclude observations
where the names of the funds are missing in the CRSP database. Data may be reported prior to the
year of fund organization if a fund is incubated before it is made publicly available, and these funds
might not report their names or some other fund attributes, as shown by Evans (2004). Incubated
funds also tend to be smaller, which motivates us to exclude funds that had in the previous month
less than $5 million in assets under management.
In the next step, we are able to match about 94% of the CRSP funds to the Spectrum database.
The unmatched funds tend to be younger and smaller than the funds for which we ¯nd data in
Spectrum. Wermers (2000) mentions that the Spectrum data set often does not have any holdings
data available during the ¯rst few quarters listed in the CRSP database.
Mutual fund families introduced di®erent share classes in the 1990s. Since di®erent share classes
have the same holdings composition, we aggregate all the observations pertaining to di®erent share
classes into one observation. For the qualitative attributes of funds (e.g., name, objectives, year of
origination), we retain the observation of the oldest fund. For the total net assets under management
(TNA), we sum the TNAs of the di®erent share classes. Finally, for the other quantitative attributes
of funds (e.g., returns, expenses, loads), we take the weighted average of the attributes of the
individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged TNAs of the individual share classes.
For most of our sample period, mutual funds are required to disclose their holdings semi-
annually. A large number of funds disclose their holdings quarterly, while a small number of funds
have gaps between holding disclosure dates of more than six months. To ¯ll these gaps, we impute
the holdings of missing quarters using the most recently available holdings, assuming that mutual
funds follow a buy-and-hold strategy. In our sample, 72% of the observations are from the most
recent quarter and less than 5% of the holdings are more than two quarters old. We exclude funds
that have fewer than 10 identi¯ed stock positions and funds that did not disclose their holdings
during the last year. This ¯nal selection criterion reduces the number of mutual funds used in this
study to 3,261 funds.
19Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of equity mutual funds over the period 1980
to 2005. Statistics for all market conditions, up markets only and down markets only are presented.
Conditions Mean S.D. Median p25 p75
Size ($M) (TNA) All 941.1529 3699.2923 159.6960 47.2000 559.7890
Up only 853.9363 3335.2786 152.3560 48.0220 529.9000
Down only 894.0135 3371.6658 148.7805 42.4790 524.0000
Annual Expense Ratio (Exp) All 0.0128 0.0048 0.0123 0.0097 0.0154
Up only 0.0123 0.0047 0.0117 0.0093 0.0150
Down only 0.0131 0.0048 0.0125 0.0099 0.0158
Fund Flow (NMG) All 0.1055 0.5646 0.0018 -0.0335 0.0697
Up only 0.1443 1.0587 0.0114 -0.0287 0.0946
Down only 0.0571 0.2287 -0.0039 -0.0329 0.0465
Raw Return All 0.0263 0.1045 0.0313 -0.0226 0.0868
Up only 0.0874 0.0690 0.0958 0.0454 0.1328
Down only -0.0584 0.1196 -0.0439 -0.1519 0.0369
Alpha (4-factor) All -0.0035 0.0392 -0.0032 -0.0215 0.0147
Up only -0.0056 0.0346 -0.0040 -0.0229 0.0131
Down only -0.0069 0.0486 -0.0044 -0.0297 0.0176
Age (years) All 13.0157 14.2268 8.0000 4.0000 16.0000
Up only 13.4933 14.7721 8.0000 3.0000 17.0000
Down only 12.8701 13.8701 8.0000 4.0000 16.0000
20Table 2: Fund Strategies Conditional on Market Returns
The dependent variable is BetaDeviation in Columns (1) and (2), SectorDeviation in Columns
(3) and (4) and UnsystematicDeviation in Columns (5) and (6). BetaDeviation is calculated
as the absolute value of the di®erence between fund i's beta in quarter t and the average beta in
that quarter of all funds in fund i's objective class. Individual fund beta is a market beta from a
four-factor model calculated using 36 months of past returns. SectorDeviation is de¯ned as the
mean square root of the sum of squared di®erences between the share of fund i's assets in each of 10
industry sectors of Fama and French (1997) and the mean share in each sector in quarter t among all
funds in fund i's objective class (aggressive growth, growth, or value). UnsystematicDeviation is
calculated as the absolute value of the di®erence between a fund's unsystematic risk, UnsysRiskit,
and the sample average of this variable over all funds in fund i's objective class in quarter t.
UnsysRiskit is the absolute value of the residual from the four-factor model of Carhart (1997).
I(¼t = Up) is an indicator variable equal to one if the market is up and zero otherwise; I(¼t = Down)
is an indicator variable equal to one if the market is down and zero otherwise. Our controls include
fund age, a natural logarithm of fund assets, and new money growth de¯ned as a growth in fund
assets over time. The data covers the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors have been included in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Beta Sector Unsys
Deviation Deviation Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(¼t = Up) -.013 -.023 .014 .011 -.019 -.015
(.007)¤¤ (.009)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤ (.007) (.058) (.025)
I(¼t = Down) .002 -.005 .015 .016 .041 .099
(.010) (.009) (.006)¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.024)¤ (.025)¤¤¤
Age -.0005 -.0003 -.0002 -.001 -.0007 -.004
(.0001)¤¤¤ (.0002)¤¤ (.0002) (.0004)¤¤¤ (.0004)¤ (.0006)¤¤¤
Log(Assets) -.002 -.001 -.006 -.003 .007 .014
(.0005)¤¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤
NMG .003 .003 -.008 -.012 .012 .011
(.001)¤¤¤ (.0009)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤
Observations 66,791 66,791 66,791 66,791 66,791 66,791
R2 .062 .074 .054 .061 .071 .105
Time Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random Fund Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
21Table 3: Flow-Performance Relationship Conditional on Market Returns
The dependent variable is the subsequent fund °ow as de¯ned in equation 3. I(¼t = Up) is an
indicator variable equal to one if the market is up and zero otherwise; I(¼t = Down) is an indicator
variable equal to one if the market is down and zero otherwise. Performance is computed using
Carhart's (1997) 4-factor model. Our controls include fund age, a natural logarithm of fund assets,
and time-¯xed e®ects. The data covers the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors have been included
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Subs. Flow Subs. Flow Subs. Flow Subs. Flow
Performance 0.51 0.645 0.512 0.635
(0.047)*** (0.071)*** (0.047)*** (0.069)***
Age -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Log(TNA) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)
Expenses 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Dummy(High) -0.089 -0.064
x Performance (0.100) (0.106)
Dummy(Low) -0.361 -0.32
x Performance (0.080)*** (0.086)***
Performance Sq. 0.888 0.432
(0.372)** (0.617)
Dummy(High) 0.361
x Performance Sq. (0.948)
Dummy(Low) 0.436
x Performance Sq. (0.734)
Constant 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.017
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Observations 61924 61924 61924 61924
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Time Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
22Table 4: Flow-Performance Relationship, Market Conditions, and Managerial
Strategies
The dependent variable is the subsequent fund °ow as de¯ned in equation 3. I(¼t = Up) is an
indicator variable equal to one if the market is up and zero otherwise; I(¼t = Down) is an indicator
variable equal to one if the market is down and zero otherwise. Fund investment strategy variables
are as described in Table 2. Performance is computed using a four-factor model of Carhart's (1997).
Controls variables not shown in the table due to space considerations include fund age, a natural
logarithm of fund assets, expenses and any other variables included in Table 3. The data covers
the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors have been included in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
signi¯cance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Subsequent Flow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I(¼t = Down) .044 .047 .050
x BetaDeviation (.012)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤
I(¼t = Up) -.004 .005 .005
x BetaDeviation (.016) (.016) (.016)
I(¼t = Down) .002 -.0007 -.0001
x UnsysDeviation (.004) (.004) (.004)
I(¼t = Up) -.012 -.012 -.012
x UnsysDeviation (.004)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤
I(¼t = Down) .011 .012 .012
x SectorDeviation (.006)¤¤ (.006)¤¤ (.006)¤¤
I(¼t = Up) -.014 -.012 -.012
x SectorDeviation (.007)¤¤ (.007)¤ (.007)¤
BetaDeviation -.018 -.024 -.018
(.008)¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.009)¤¤
UnsysDeviation .014 .015 .018
(.002)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤
SectorDeviation .002 .0008 .0002
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Performance .550 .548 .551 .547 .503
(.021)¤¤¤ (.021)¤¤¤ (.021)¤¤¤ (.021)¤¤¤ (.021)¤¤¤
Performance Sq. .424 .327 .387 .369 .463
(.181)¤¤ (.180)¤ (.181)¤¤ (.181)¤¤ (.183)¤¤
I(¼t = Down) -.312 -.303 -.314 -.304 -.302
x Performance (.034)¤¤¤ (.034)¤¤¤ (.034)¤¤¤ (.034)¤¤¤ (.034)¤¤¤
I(¼t = Up) -.083 -.078 -.080 -.078 -.087
x Performance (.049)¤ (.049) (.049) (.049) (.049)¤
I(¼t = Down) .376 .475 .467 .345 .199
x Performance Sq (.258) (.258)¤ (.257)¤ (.260) (.261)
I(¼t = Up) .314 .495 .325 .539 .474
x Performance Sq (.517) (.518) (.514) (.521) (.523)
I(¼t = Up) -.031 -.019 -.018 -.016 -.029
(.017)¤ (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017)¤
I(¼t = Down) -.007 .005 .003 .019 .004
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.016) (.016)
Observations 64,455 64,455 64,455 64,455 64,455
R2 .034 .033 .034 .041 .054
Time Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Random E®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed E®ects Yes
23Figure 1: Fund-Performance Relationship Conditional on Market Returns
The graph plots the unexplained °ows, as de¯ned by et;i in equation 8, for each of our twenty
groups. All funds are grouped, every quarter, into 20 equal-sized bins based on their four-factor
alpha performance during that quarter. "High" identi¯es the relationship observed when the market
was up during the previous quarter; "Low" identi¯es the relationship observed when the market
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24Figure 2: Quarterly Performance Persistence Conditional on Market Returns
This graph plots the four-factor alpha on 10 equal-weighted portfolios based on the deciles associated
with past performance. "High" identi¯es the relationship observed when the market was up during
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